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Entrepreneurship and Dynamic Capabilities: 
A Review, Model and Research Agenda  
 
Abstract 
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The emergent literature on dynamic capabilities and their role in value creation is 
riddled with inconsistencies, overlapping definitions, and outright contradictions.  Yet, 
the theoretical and practical importance of developing and applying dynamic capabilities 
to sustain a firm’s competitive advantage in complex and volatile external environments 
has catapulted this issue to the forefront of the research agendas of many scholars. In 
this paper, we offer a definition of dynamic capabilities, separating them from substan-
tive capabilities as well as from their antecedents and consequences. We also present a set 
of propositions that outline (1) how substantive capabilities and dynamic capabilities are 
related to one another, (2) how this relationship is moderated by organizational knowl-
edge and skills, (3) how organizational age affects the speed of utilization of dynamic ca-
pabilities and the learning mode used in organizational change, and (4) how organiza-
tional knowledge and market dynamism affect the likely value of dynamic capabilities.  
Our discussion and model help to delineate key differences in the dynamic capabilities 
that new ventures and established companies have, revealing a key source of strategic 
heterogeneity between these firms. 
 
 
  
3
Entrepreneurial companies create, define, discover, and exploit opportunities--
frequently well ahead of their rivals (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994; Miller, 1983; Sathe, 2003).  
While debate persists about the correlates of the processes associated with opportunity 
creation, discovery and successful exploitation (Davidsson, 2004), most scholars readily 
acknowledge the importance of these processes in generating value for firms and their 
owners. Yet, to date, research has not provided a compelling explanation for the ability 
of some new and established companies to continuously create, define, discover and ex-
ploit entrepreneurial opportunities.  
We propose that one source of these differences lies in these firms’ developing 
and applying different dynamic capabilities, which we define as the abilities to re-configure a 
firm’s resources and routines in the manner envisioned and deemed appropriate by its principal decision-
maker(s). Indeed, the creation and subsequent use of dynamic capabilities correspond to 
the entrepreneur, the entrepreneurial team, or the firm’s senior management's perception of 
opportunities to productively change existing routines or resource configurations, their 
willingness to undertake such change, and their ability to implement these changes (Katona, 
1951; Penrose, 1959). This ability is largely determined by the motivation, skills and ex-
periences of the firm’s key managers (Penrose, 1959). We further propose that, although 
dynamic capabilities may enable firms to pursue opportunities in new and potentially ef-
fective ways, they do not guarantee organizational success or survival. Consequently, we 
will explain why it is important to distinguish conceptually between dynamic capabilities 
and their possible outcomes. Finally, we will address theoretically how the processes of 
creating and sustaining such capabilities may differ in new versus established firms, 
which often battle for technological and market leadership especially in nascent and 
emerging industries.  
This article seeks to bring clarity to the notion of dynamic capabilities and their 
potential and realized relationships to the performance of new ventures and established 
companies. This article addresses three research questions: (a) What are dynamic capabili-
ties and how do they differ from substantive capabilities? (b) How do dynamic capabili-
ties come into existence, and what is the role of the firm’s entrepreneurial and learning 
processes in creating and sustaining these capabilities? and (c) How do new ventures and 
established companies vary in their dynamic capabilities and what are the consequences 
of these differences?  
This article makes three contributions to the literature. First, we review the litera-
ture and surface important (but subtle) inconsistencies and ambiguities in the extant lit-
erature and suggest remedies that can direct future studies. Second, we advance the un-
derstanding of dynamic capabilities in new vs. established firms. The dynamic capabilities 
literature has given scant attention to younger firms as they create, discover, and exploit 
opportunities. However, recently researchers have begun to probe the birth and evolu-
tion of new ventures’ dynamic capabilities (e.g., Arthurs & Busenitz, 2005; Zahra & Fila-
totchev, 2004). We believe that a systematic comparison of these different contexts pro-
vides new insights into the creation and exploitation of dynamic capabilities. Third, we 
deepen the discussion by advancing a set of propositions (largely based on a learning 
theory lens) regarding the relationships between substantive and dynamic capabilities, the 
effects of age and learning styles on capabilities, and the contingencies that affect the 
value of dynamic capabilities. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, we review the literature  to show how 
dynamic capabilities have been portrayed in the literature. We then examine ambiguities 
in the literature and how they might be resolved. Next, focusing on differences in new 
vs. established firms, we develop propositions on the relationships among substantive 
capabilities, dynamic capabilities, learning modes, and performance.  Finally, we conclude 
with a discussion of our propositions. 
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The literature on dynamic capabilities has addressed the fundamental question of 
how companies develop the skills and competencies that allow them to compete and gain 
an enduring competitive advantage. To appreciate the contributions of this literature, it is 
important to separate studies based on organizational type (new ventures vs. established 
corporations). The literature suggests that these firms need different types of capabilities.  
To further gain insights into the contributions of the literature, it is essential to separate 
studies based on their intellectual foci. Some studies have focused on the nature of dynamic 
capabilities; others have addressed the antecedents vs. outcomes of these capabilities. Still 
other studies have explored the various processes and activities needed to develop and 
exploit dynamic capabilities for competitive advantage.  As would be expected, some 
studies had multiple intellectual foci and examined more than one area by covering; for 
example, covering the process of dynamic capabilities as well as the outcomes of these 
capabilities. 
[Insert Table 1 about Here] 
 Even though our review of the literature is not exhaustive, it serves to show that 
most research and theory building has focused on established companies thus ignoring 
new ventures and SMEs. We find this gap in the literature to be puzzling given that 
SMEs and new ventures need unique and dynamic capabilities that allow them to survive, 
achieve legitimacy, and reap the benefit of their innovation (Sapienza, Autio, George & 
Zahra, 2006). The skills and competencies that these firms have must to be upgraded and 
new dynamic capabilities are built to ensure successful adaptation for growth.   
 Reviewing the studies in Table 1, we note also that prior researchers have studied 
established companies in diverse industries, allowing for a richer test of the key proposi-
tions of the dynamic capability view. The literature shows that established companies 
benefit from having dynamic capabilities in crafting new business and corporate strate-
gies (Bowman & Ambrosini, 2003); entering new market areans (King & Tucci, 2002); 
completing successful mergers;  learning new skills (Bowman & Ambrosini 2003; Zollo 
& Winter, 2002); overcoming inertia (King & Tucci, 2002; Repenning & Sterman, 2002); 
leveraging their other resources (Bowman & Ambrosini, 2003); introducing innovative 
programs that stimulate strategic change (Repenning & Sterman, 2002);  and successfully 
commercializing new technologies generated within their R&D units (Marsh & Stock, 
2003). These activities increase organizational agility and market responsiveness (Zahra & 
George, 2002b). The literature also suggests that dynamic capabilities also encourage and 
facilitate internationalization (Griffith & Harvey, 2001) and learning in international mar-
kets.   More broadly, prior research suggests that dynamic capabilities are also important 
for the creation and evolution of new ventures (Newbert, 2005) and successful entry and 
survival, especially in international markets (Sapienza etal.,  2006).  
Our review of the literature highlights the dearth of studies that examined SMEs 
and new ventures has limited the context in which dynamic capabilities are studied. The 
few studies reported about these companies to date (Table 1) tend to be case study 
based, focused on a given activity such as internationalization (George, Zahra, Autio & 
Sapienza, 2004). The literature does not tell much about the antecedents of new firms’ 
dynamic capabilities. Moreover, our review of the literature and the studies summarized 
in Table 1, suggests that prior researchers have not given much attention to the process 
by which these capabilities develop, emerge or evolve especially in younger firms that 
have limited resources, knowledge bases and expertise in building and integrating diverse 
capabilities.   
    
Dynamic Capabilities: What are They, and Why are They Important? 
The emergent discussion of dynamic capabilities in the literature is grounded in 
the evolutionary theory of the firm (Nelson & Winter, 1982). The theory traces its intel-
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lectual heritage to Alchian (1950) and March and Simon (1958, 1993) who have sug-
gested that because managers make decisions under uncertainty and are boundedly ra-
tional, they “satisfice” rather than optimize in searching for and selecting solutions to 
problems. The implication is that managers (both in young and established firms) do not, 
and probably should not, create "once-and-for-all" solutions or routines for their opera-
tions but continually re-configure or revise the capabilities they have developed. When 
the environment is dynamic or unpredictable, firms are especially challenged to revise 
their routines (March, 1991). The new routines form the foundation of firms' knowledge 
bases.  However, along with these new capabilities, the firm also develops the capacity to 
change routines and integrate them into their operations.  This description introduces 
three elements that have come to be confounded in the literature: (1) the ability to solve a 
problem (a substantive capability), (2) the presence of rapidly changing problems (an en-
vironmental characteristic), and (3) the ability to change the way the firm solves its prob-
lems (a higher-order dynamic capability to alter capabilities).  
We refer, as have some other theoreticians (e.g., Winter, 2003), to the set of abili-
ties and resources that go into solving a problem or achieving an outcome as a substan-
tive (or "ordinary") capability. We distinguish substantive capability from the dynamic abil-
ity to change or re-configure existing substantive capabilities, which we term as the firm's dynamic 
capabilities.  Thus, the qualifier 'dynamic' distinguishes one type of ability (e.g., the sub-
stantive ability to develop new products) from another type of ability (e.g., the ability to 
re-form the way the firm develops new products).  A new routine for product develop-
ment is a new substantive capability but the ability to change such capabilities is a dynamic 
capability.i  Just as a firm has many substantive capabilities of varying strengths, it has 
many dynamic capabilities of varying strengths. For example, the firm may have a strong 
dynamic capability to change its product development routine while at the same time 
have but a weak ability to reconfigure its accounting systems. 
The literature on the distinction between dynamic and substantive capabilities is 
in its infancy (Winter, 2003). Reviewing this literature, we find it riddled with inconsis-
tencies, overlapping definitions, and contradictions (Salvato, 2003).  Nonetheless, the 
theoretical and practical importance of dynamic capabilities to a firm’s competitive ad-
vantage (especially in complex, volatile, and uncertain external environments) has cata-
pulted this issue to the forefront of the research agendas of many scholars (Daniel & 
Wilson, 2003; Lampel & Shamsie, 2003; Lenox & King, 2004; Salvato, 2003; Teece, Pis-
ano & Shuen, 1997; Zott, 2003).   
Lack of agreement about whether a dynamic capability refers to substantive ca-
pabilities in volatile environments or to the organization's ability to alter existing substan-
tive capabilities, regardless of the volatility of the environment, is perhaps the single larg-
est source of confusion.  This confusion is compounded when effectiveness is incorpo-
rated into definitions. Such definitions are implicitly tautological.  For example, in his 
thoughtful analysis, Anand (2001) argues that a dynamic alliance capability is an organiza-
tional ability to choose good and reliable partners and to structure relationships with 
partners in a manner that improves performance.ii Are we to infer that if performance is 
not superior, then the firm does not possess a dynamic alliance capability? Or, if it does 
perform well, does this mean it has such a capability? Further, if the environment is not 
very volatile, does that mean that the firm's capabilities are not 'dynamic'? We encounter 
the same difficulties in interpreting many of the existing definitions of dynamic capabili-
ties (see Table 2). 
[Insert Table 2 about Here] 
 While entrepreneurs and managers are the key agents of change, dynamic capa-
bilities may also be embedded in organizational routines and may be employed to recon-
figure the firm’s resource base by shedding idle or decaying resources (Sirmon & Hitt, 
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2003), or recombining resources in innovative ways that develop virtually new substan-
tive capabilities in existing or new market arenas (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Schumpeter, 
1942; Sirmon, Hitt & Ireland, 2006). Dynamic capabilities may be most valuable when the 
external environment is changing rapidly or unpredictably (as several studies in Table 2 
suggest), but a volatile or changing environment is not a necessary component of a dy-
namic capability. One of our key objectives is to stem the proliferation of confusing dis-
cussions regarding substantive capabilities and dynamic capabilities. Table 2 presents, in 
chronological order, a sample of the most well-known definitions that have appeared in 
the literature to date.  
As we review prior definitions (Table 2), we find that they share the idea that dy-
namic capabilities ensure that a firm's substantive capabilities change over time (Rindova & 
Kotha, 2001). Some, however, refer to dynamic capabilities only as capabilities that re-
spond to changes in the environment. Others require that dynamic capabilities are only 
those that provide a source of competitive advantage. From a theoretical point of view, 
the requirement that dynamic capabilities are only those that result in competitive advan-
tage represents an unsatisfying tautology. iii  Although most definitions imply that dy-
namic capabilities are (or can be) valuable, some scholars correctly note that dynamic ca-
pabilities create value indirectly. Helfat and Peteraf (2003: 999), for instance, observe 
that, unlike new product development for example, dynamic capabilities “do not involve 
production of a good or provision of a marketable service.”  That is, the capacity to 
change routines is valuable to the extent that the resulting substantive capabilities are 
valuable.  Yet, reviewing the literature and Table 1 reveals that even if the resulting sub-
stantive capabilities at a given point in time prove ineffective, the dynamic capabilities 
may yet prove valuable the next time the firm needs to alter the way it competes.   
Inconsistencies and Ambiguities in the Extant Literature 
Reviewing the literature reveals that  researchers have tended to identify dynamic 
capabilities post hoc, inferring their existence from successful organizational outcomes 
such as profitability and growth, as prior definitions would suggest (Table 2). This prac-
tice might reflect the difficulty of gaining access to managers and/or entrepreneurs as 
they build or upgrade these capabilities and the difficulty of distinguishing the creation of 
a new substantive capability from the transformation of an existing capability (i.e., the 
application of a dynamic capability to reconfigure the firm’s resources or their uses). The 
result is that dynamic capabilities have been conceptualized and assessed in ways that 
make it difficult or even impossible to separate their existence from their effects. 
Another source of the confusion in the literature is the tendency of some schol-
ars to equate the presence of dynamic capabilities with environmental conditions.  For 
example, in their seminal article Teece et al. (1997) identify a dynamic capability as the 
firm’s ability to address rapidly changing environments. Clearly, the use (and usefulness) 
of dynamic capabilities is greater in dynamic environments, but one should not confound 
external conditions with organizational capability.  In dynamic environments, firms can 
gain but temporary advantages that evaporate with changes in environmental conditions. 
These firms have to continually reconfigure their resources to protect their competitive 
lead (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003; Sirmon et al., 2005). Yet, judging whether a capability is 'dy-
namic' or not depending on the rate of change in a firm’s external environment misses 
the true nature of the distinction between first and second order capabilities. Further-
more, the need for reconfiguration or the renewal of routines may emanate from changes 
in organizational conditions (e.g., change in resources) rather than in the external envi-
ronment. For example, when a young firm undergoes rapid growth, it faces the challenge 
of how to reconfigure its internal processes in order to achieve effective functional spe-
cialization and to cultivate it through effective integration (Churchill & Lewis, 1983; 
Hambrick & Crozier, 1985; Penrose, 1959; Vohora, Wright & Lockett, 2004). Moreover, 
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if a firm's leaders come to believe that operating in a dramatically different way would 
improve performance (regardless of the level of environmental volatility), their ability to 
implement desired change would demonstrate a  dynamic capability, whether or not they 
were correct in their belief.  Indeed, misapprehension of the state of nature or misuse of 
the dynamic capabilities can undermine results.  
We view dynamic capabilities as the abilities to re-configure a firm’s resources 
and routines in the manner envisioned and deemed appropriate by the firm’s principal 
decision-maker(s).iv Our definition parallels that of Winter (2003) who characterizes an 
"ordinary" (substantive) capability as the organization's ability to produce a desired out-
put (tangible or intangible), and a dynamic capability as the higher-order ability to ma-
nipulate their substantive capabilities. The distinctions we add are: (1) to tie the definition 
not necessarily to financial performance but to the ability to reconfigure as desired, and 
(2) to make explicit the role of decision-makers in enacting and directing such capabili-
ties.  The first distinction avoids some of the performance tautology noted in the litera-
ture and past definitions (presented in Table 2).  The latter distinction emphasizes the 
strategic choice perspective (Child, 1972, 1997) underlying our view and acknowledges 
the responsibility of managers for the actions of the firm (Ghoshal, 2005).  
As we reflect on the literature and the definitions shown in Table 2, we believe 
that several implicit myths about dynamic capabilities should be questioned and dis-
pelled.  Importantly, dynamic capabilities are not the sole province of established firms.  
The creation of dynamic capabilities and the transformation of substantive capabilities 
can commence very early in an organization’s life, as we elaborate later. Further, dynamic 
capabilities develop in response to a variety of conditions, not just environmental dyna-
mism, for example: (a) perceived external change that does not fully accord with objec-
tive facts; (b) learning about external conditions for the first time, and, among other 
things; and  (c) internal pressures towards change. In short, the possession of dynamic 
capabilities per se does not necessarily lead to superior organizational performance. Dy-
namic capabilities must be well-targeted and deployed in order to achieve strategic goals. 
Therefore, the management of these capabilities is critical in gaining organizational per-
formance-related benefits. Further, the building and use of dynamic capabilities are costly 
and can therefore lead either to losses or gains; some impact short-term performance, 
whereas others are likely to be important in the long run. Some dynamic capabilities play 
only a secondary role in enabling substantaive capabilities to generate value. Dynamic 
capabilities emanate from a variety of situations, and they vary in timing and effects. 
In summary, our definition emphasizes the dynamism of the capability itself, not 
the environment. This definition puts “managerial choice” at the center of the conversa-
tion (King & Tucci, 2002). Such choices give direction, substance, and variety to the 
firm’s entrepreneurial activities (Miller, 1983; Sathe, 2003).  Consequently, we further 
urge researchers to avoid the tautology of suggesting that successful outcomes necessarily 
signal the possession of dynamic capabilities or vice versa. 
Having differentiated substantive from dynamic capabilities and offered a defini-
tion of dynamic capabilities, we now build on the literature to develop a set of proposi-
tions that further delineate the relationships among substantive capabilities, dynamic ca-
pabilities, integration skills, organizational age, learning modes, and organizational per-
fromance.  
 
A Theoretical Model of Dynamic Capabilities and Their Correlates 
Thus far, we have not discussed how dynamic capabilities come into existence nor the 
factors affecting their nature and use. Table 1 shows that several authors have discussed 
specific qualities of dynamic capabilities (Zollo &  Winter, 2002), the internal and exter-
nal antecedents of their formation processes (Blyler & Coff,  2003; Korr & Mahoney, 
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2005; Verona & Ravasi, 2003; Wheeler 2002; Zollo & Winter, 2002) and the various 
managerial and entrepreneurial activities and processes associated with the evolution of 
these capabilities (George, 2005; King & Tucci, 2002; Salvato, 2003). These studies are 
informative in highlighting the contradictory forces that shape the emergence and subse-
quent evolution of dynamic capabilities. Yet, a model that integrates prior findings on the 
various activities associated with the evolution of these capabilities is lacking.  Below we 
present such a model, hoping to bring clarity  to this issue. 
 Figure 1 presents a broad, stylized model of the various activities associated with 
the creation of dynamic capabilities and, in turn, their effect on a company’s perform-
ance. The starting point in Figure 1 is the firm’s entrepreneurial activities, defined as 
those activities that center on the identification and exploitation of opportunities. Figure 
1 depicts entrepreneurial activities as influencing the selection of resources and skills and 
promoting organizational learning processes to capture external knowledge as new situa-
tions arise.  These choices combine to create new substantive capabilities and the organi-
zation's knowledge base.  Organizational knowledge is the set of all that is known or un-
derstood by the organization and its members, whereas the firm's substantive capabilities 
are the set of things that the firm can do.  Clearly, the two affect one another in that what 
the firm can do (its skills) is shaped in part by what it knows, and what the firm knows is 
affected in part by what it does.  Together, organizational knowledge and substantive ca-
pabilities determine which dynamic capabilities are necessary to adapt to emerging condi-
tions.  The bi-directional arrows to and from dynamic capabilities indicate that dynamic 
capabilities are affected by and transform substantive capabilities and the firm's knowl-
edge base. Together, the substantive capabilities and firm’s knowledge base directly and 
interactively affect the organization's performance.  Finally, performance results affect 
future entrepreneurial choices.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 1 implies that entrepreneurial processes shape the recombination of sub-
stantive capabilities and, over time, increase its “strategic variety” which Miller (1993) 
views as the ability of the firm to conceive and implement varied, multiple, and innova-
tive strategic responses to the challenges it faces in its environment. However, our central 
interest here is to elucidate how substantive and dynamic capabilities are related to one 
another, how these differ between young versus established firms, and how these differ-
ences and environmental conditions shape the likely effects of dynamic capabilities on 
performance of organizations.  We now develop four sets of propositions which address 
our earlier research questions. 
 
The Nature, Development, and Effects of Dynamic Capabilties 
 The propositions we develop are based primarily on learning (e.g., Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990)  and behavioral theories (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963).  One basic as-
sumption that we make is that there are costs to developing and using dynamic capabili-
ties.  These costs involve the consumption of organizational resources in devising new 
capabilities and in re-configuring existing capabilities, not to mention the potential costs 
of wrongly estimating the need for change. Thus, although such capabilities are devel-
oped in order to realize strategic advantages, their development does not ensure organ-
izational success.   
 Figure 1 implies that, in the earliest instance, substantive capabilities precede dy-
namic capabilites.  Over time, however, the relationship between substantive and dy-
namic capabilities becomes complex and intricately interwoven.  Our first set of proposi-
tions examines how the exercise of capabilities affects their strength and persistence. 
Relationships between substantive and dynamic capabilities.  As we have 
indicated earlier, dynamic capabilities are affected by and operate on substantive capabili-
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ties.  In Figure 2, we explicate in greater detail the complex relationship between the two.  
A path dependency develops over time as the configuration of, understanding of, and 
"automatic" processes of substantive capabilities are embedded in what the firm does 
and how it does it.    
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Both learning and behavioral theories of organizational change recognize that decisions 
to change are dependent on the willingness to change, the awareness of the need to 
change, and the perceived capacity to change effectively (Katona, 1951; Penrose, 1959).  
Learning theory holds that organizational capacities evolve out of learning from repeated 
trials (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 2002a).   As firms exercise their capa-
bilities in similar and dissimilar circumstances, they learn more about cause-effect rela-
tionships and how to achieve desired results.  In short, the effects of intense, repeated 
exercise of routines is increased knowledge of cause-effect relationships and hence 
greater confidence in their use.  Therefore, the exercise of routines is self-reinforcing in 
that it reduces variability in the results (allowing managers to minimize risks by repeating 
these routines rather than trying new ones), minimizes the costs of repeating these ac-
tions, and  increases managers' confidence in their future use of these routines.  These 
ideas suggest that the more managers exercise substantive capabilities and dynamic capa-
bilities, the more facile they become with these capabilities. Therefore: 
P1:  Substantive capabilities and dynamic capabilities strengthen with use. 
 
 Our first proposition implies that the more firms exercise their capabilities, the 
more they gain command over the efficient exercise of these capabilities.  The inverse is 
also implied: when firms do not exercise these capabilities, their command over these ca-
pabilities will atrophy.  Nonetheless, learning theory suggests that are dangers inherent in 
exercising the same capabilities, especially substantive capabilities, without exploring for 
new ones.   
The well-known notions of competency- and propinquity-traps (Ahuja & 
Lampert, 2001) acknowledge the self-reinforcing nature of substantive capabilities im-
plied in our first proposition.  However, the very command and efficiency gained 
through repetition has a downside: they provide disincentive to change.  That is, great 
command of substative capabilities may induce firms to repeatedly exercise those capa-
bilities in exactly the same way with little significant effort to adjust them.  The result will 
be ever-increasing command and ever-increasing tightly-coupled relationships among 
sub-routines. Therefore:  
P2a. The repeated use of substantive capabilities without change (i.e., 
without developing or exercising dynamic capabilities) renders substan-
tive capabilities more difficult to change in the future. 
 
 At the other extreme, a firm could be continually tinkering with its substantive 
capabilities.  One of our premises is that such tinkering is costly.  Continual change con-
sumes time and resources and disrupts the learning process by preventing the firm from 
being able to observe differences in the same processes under different conditions.  All 
else equal, the cost of executing the firm's key substantive capabilities (e.g., new product 
development or distribution capabilities) will be minimized if the systems, resources, and 
processes in place are used uniformly across time.  If new individuals are chosen to carry 
out functions, learning time will be required; if different systems or processes are to be 
put in place, the accommodation of the old with the new will also take time and consume 
resources.   
Yet, if a firm is continually utilizing its dynamic capabilities, there may be gains in 
efficiency to be realized when major changes are suddenly determined to be necessary.  
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According to P2a, firms that have made little use of their dynamic capabilities will find 
altering their substantive capabilities difficult, costly, and minimally effective.  The short-
term costs of frequent exercise of dynamic capabilities must be weighed against the po-
tentially large costs of leaving substantive capabilities unaltered. Therefore: 
P2b. The repeated application of dynamic capabilities to substantive ca-
pabilities increases the costs of substantive capability utilization but de-
creases the costs of future dynamic capability utilization. 
 
 A key direct value of the exercise of dynamic capabilities is that they keep sub-
stantive capabilities flexible, but at a short-term cost.  Firms will typically develop a 
rhythm or habit in their application of dynamic capabilities, establishing a pattern that 
regulates their propensity to alter substantive capabilites.  In the next section we consider 
the primary factors (beyond idiosyncratic preference) that influence the frequency of use. 
Triggers for Developing/Using Dynamic Capabiltities.  The persistence of 
existing capabilities depends on the strength of the perceived need to change, the impe-
tus for change, and the managerial capacity to integrate and recombine resources as de-
sired (Penrose, 1959). Hamel and Prahalad (1994) have shown that allocating and dedi-
cating resources are not in themselves sufficient to build capabilities or sustain a competi-
tive advantage. Yet, fear of disrupting existing systems constrains firms from change.  We 
propose here that a firm's facility with integration, its inability to keep up with competi-
tion, and the rate of change or volatility in the market environment provide for develop-
ing and/or utilizing its dynamic capabilities.  
The detailed explication of the relationship between substantive and dynamic ca-
pabilities depicted in Figure 2 indicates the role of integration.  Noting a paucity of re-
search on capability development, transformation and evolution, Burgelman (1991) illus-
trates the complexity of the process by which senior managers choose new capabilities. 
Burgelman’s work shows that inevitable conflicts arise between autonomous (e.g., im-
provisation) and induced strategic behavior (e.g., formally planned actions). These con-
flicts can be especially acute in new ventures  because their “search” processes (March, 
1991) are not well developed, command is in the hands of a few people, and strategic 
objectives are still in flux.  In established companies, conflicts also arise regarding priori-
ties (what areas and capabilities to build) as well as how to obtain and assemble resources 
without incurring the wrath of existing powers. Coordination, selection and combination 
are important dimensions of the process of integration; these enable the firm to build its 
dynamic capability to reconfigure their substantive capability routines. Coordination in-
volves formal and informal efforts to resolve disputes, disagreements, or conflicts about 
the nature and scope of capabilities to be built and how to obtain needed resources 
(Zahra & Nielsen, 2002). Selection induces coherence through the identification of those 
capabilities worthy of further refinement and development. The combination of these 
different capabilities occurs once coordination and selection have occured. In sum, the 
aim of integration in both new and established ventures is to increase efficiency. Several 
researchers (e.g., Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Iansiti & Clark, 1994; Teece et al., 1997) 
have highlighted the importance of integration in their discussion and definition of dy-
namic capabilities. 
In new ventures and established companies alike, managers may identify multiple 
capabilities as potential candidates for development. Conflicts about the judicious use of 
resources often pressure entrepreneurs and managers to make difficult choices about the 
capabilities that could be further developed. These choices are shaped by entrepreneurs 
and managers’ views of their competitive arena, projections about the industry’s evolu-
tion, and beliefs about their ability to integrate the firm’s capabilities. These increase “va-
riety” within the capability development process (Burgelman, 1991). Firms make use of 
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this variety to map out strategic options and exploit their capabilities. But managers must 
decide how many (and which)  of these capabilities they can afford to develop. 
The ability to combine multiple capabilities in a coherent fashion can minimize 
redundancies, ensure congruence of strategic direction, and set the stage for effective de-
ployment of resources (Penrose, 1959; Zahra & Nielsen, 2002).  The possession of well-
developed integration skills helps a firm overcome its fear of change.   It also sets the 
expectation that exercising dynamic capabilities will result in positive outcomes for the 
firm, and thereby increases the propensity to enact re-configuration processes.    These 
observations lead to the following proposition: 
P3. Integration skills increase the development and use of dynamic capa-
bilities. 
 
Implicit proposition 3 is that the more confidence a firm has in its integration 
skills, the more inclined it will be to develop dynamic capabilities.  Yet, as we have as-
serted throughout this article, such skills will not necessarily ensure success.  Behavioral 
theory holds that when firms succeed, they are apt to continue to utilize the resources, 
routines, and initiatives associated with this success (Cyert & March, 1963).  Thus, when 
a firm matches or exceeds the results of key competitors, it will see its configuration and 
execution of its substantive capabilities as adequate or superior.  Its confidence in its abil-
ity to respond to the market if necessary will be re-inforced and the search for alterna-
tives will be curtailed.  It is likely that even when firms are being marginally outper-
formed by competitors, self-serving bias and hubris (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999, Kroll, 
Toombs, & Wright, 2000) will cause them to attribute lack of success to luck or factors 
outside their control.  Still, they will not necessarily be motivated to instigate change. 
Still, as a firm's results begin to fall significantly behind referent others, the pres-
sure to change will grow.  Firms that fall well below aspirations, regardless of how good 
their integration skills may actually be, may begin to lose confidence in how they are op-
erating and may begin to seek new ways to compete.  McGrath (1995) has noted that, for 
firms in her study, change was spurred by failure via a three step process of recognition of 
the failure, interpretation of results as failure, and finally adjustment of capabilities.  In short, 
behavioral logic and empirical observation suggest that the greater the success of current 
operations, the less the incentive to change.  Success breeds a kind of complacency and 
comfort that render many firms, new and established, content to continue with the cur-
rent modes of operation.  Therefore:   
P4. Lack of success with current substantive capabilities increases the de-
velopment and use of dynamic capabilities. 
                 
The literature reveals that external factors may also trigger a firm’s use of dy-
namic capabilities.  Cyert and March (1963) observe that when the environment is vola-
tile, organizations are likely to alter their goals, priorities (“attention rules”), and where 
and how they search for new knowledge and opportunities (“search rules”).  Despite in-
ternal inertial forces for consistency, significant or constant change in environmental cir-
cumstances can make a firm aware of the inadequacy of current substantive capabilities.  
Operating in volatile environments where change is common and/or rapid, such as in 
high-technology industries, will cause firms to be aware of the need to repeatedly recon-
figure substantive capabilities (whether by pre-conceived plans or spur-of-the-moment 
responses) in order to compete.  Indeed, Moorman and Miner (1998b) found that firms 
in turbulent environments were more apt to improvise and experiment than those in 
more stable environments.   
We would expect that, on average, development and use of dynamic capabilities 
will vary with the rate of change in the industry itself.  Large disruptive events such as the 
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introduction of a radically new technology (e.g., the emergence of digital cameras) or of 
drastic changes in market segments or preferences (e.g., the emergence of the dual in-
come family) will also spur firms' efforts to develop and utilize dynamic capabilities to 
transform or reconfigure their substantive capabilities. Majumdar (2000) concluded in his 
study of the telecommunications industry over 16 years that, contrary to myths regarding 
the depth of inertia in larger firms, even larger more stable firms can and do transform in 
the face of huge structural changes. Therefore:   
P5. Major or continual environmental change increases the development 
and use of dynamic capabilities. 
 
We expect the foregoing propositions to be applicable to both young and estab-
lished firms.  The learning literature suggests, however, that younger and older firms may 
indeed vary in how and what they learn, and consequently in how much and how rapidly 
they change.  We develop in the next section propositions on the relationship between 
organizational age and modes of learning, and on the impact of the learning modes on 
speed and rate of change in capabilities. 
Organizational Age, Learning Modes, and Rate of Change.  An important 
insight from the literature is that circumstances outside the control of entrepreneurs and 
managers often require responses that are not within the firm's repertoire of routines 
(Christensen & Raynor, 2003; Miller, 1993; Moorman & Miner, 1998a, 1998b).   A firm 
must often 'invent' solutions in order to survive.  Both new and established firms engage 
in experimentation (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001), learning-by-doing (Minniti & Bygrave, 
2001), trial-and-error learning (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; Moorman & Miner, 1998a, 
b), and improvisation (Moorman & Miner, 1998 a, b) to deal with changing demands.  
However, because learning is a path dependent process wherein what firms learn de-
pends on what they already know (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George,  2002a), 
how and what firms learn and how they change depends in part on the length of their 
history and the development stage of their organizational routines (Autio, Sapienza & 
Almeida, 2000). 
  A vast literature on learning covers a wide spectrum of modes of learning from 
highly deliberate learning (Zollo & Winter, 2002) to unplanned learning (Moorman & 
Miner, 1998b).  This literature is particularly helpful in  investigating how the relatively 
well-explored arenas of improvisation, trial-and-error learning, and experimentation vary 
over the life span of organizations.  Such an examination will help to reveal how and why 
dynamic capabilities operate differently in young versus established firms.  We also con-
sider imitation as a mode for developing dynamic capabilities, though we see this ap-
proach as less systematically related to firm age than the other modes.  
Miner, Bassoff, and Moorman (2001: 319) distinguish these three learning types 
as follows: Improvisation involves real-time, unplanned experience in which action in-
forms design as it occurs. Trial-and-error learning involves the taking of actions, planned 
or unplanned, to inform future action. Experimentation is the deliberate and systematic 
use of varied conditions to learn cause-effect relationships. The majority of research on 
capability building and organizational learning has examined these processes in well-
established companies (e.g., Bosch, Volberda & Boer, 1999; Helfat, 1997).  In order to 
provide some insight into what the literature reveals, we reviewed 19 studies that touched 
upon organizational learning and capability creation that appeared from 1992 to 2002 in 
the management, strategy and entrepreneurship journals.v  Table 3 highlights the samples 
and conclusions of these studies.  Most of the studies in Table 3 have focused on estab-
lished firms in high technology industries, and most have emphasized innovation, new 
product development, or new market entry activities to illustrate concepts.  
[Insert Table 3 about Here] 
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As we reflect on prior studies we find that they are largely cross-sectional and be-
cause few focus specifically on young firms, they provide little direct empirical evidence 
on differences in learning processes for newly founded versus established firms.  As two 
exceptions, Van de Ven and Polley (1992) and Autio et al. (2000), suggest that learning 
modes and practices do change over time.  Observing a single firm over five years, Van 
de Ven and Polley (1992) noted a tendency for the firm to become more "set" in its ways 
over time.  Consistent with this view and based on panel data, Autio et al. (2000) argued 
that younger firms have some "learning advantages" because their short history provides 
them with less to unlearn.  However, taken as a whole, the empirical evidence is sugges-
tive rather than definitive.  Therefore, propositions 6a-d (below) regarding the links be-
tween organizational age and learning modes for dynamic capability development are 
based primarily on theory and logical inferences. 
Although empirical data show that firms learn via all of the above-mentioned 
modes throughout their existence, reasons exist to expect that the younger the firm, the 
more likely it is to resort to improvisation. Young firms are notorious for having to 
“fight fires” (Churchill & Lewis, 1983).  They do not possess the slack resources that 
would allow time to plan actions or to experiment with different contingencies, even if 
planning might indeed pay off (Delmar & Shane, 2003).  Furthermore, their limited ex-
perience dictates that, especially in the very earliest stages, they will be confronted with 
many situations they have never seen before.  Without adequate time or resources to plan 
fully, and without a large repertoire of prior experience, they will often be forced to im-
provise to create or enact solutions.  Over time, if they survive, the need to improvise 
will decline, even if it never disappears completely.  Consistent with these arguments, 
Moorman and Miner (1998b) found organization memory to have a negative effect on 
the tendency to use improvisation.  All else equal, as the venture builds its knowledge 
base, its need to improvise will decline. Therefore:    
P6a.  Improvisation becomes a decreasingly likely choice for developing 
and using dynamic capabilities as firms age. 
 
Trial-and-error learning (prepared actions aimed at least in part to inform future 
decisions) shares some properties with improvisation but also differs in critical ways 
(Miner et al., 2001).  Like improvisation, it implies that the firm has a significant degree 
of discomfort with its level of knowledge of the critical causal relationships. However, 
unlike improvisation, it involves planning to utilize part of the firm’s “bag of tricks” to 
learn how it should proceed in the future.  In order to engage in trial-and-error learning, 
then, the firm must build a stock of capabilities to draw upon, and it must be able to af-
ford the time to pre-plan, execute, and use the information for later significant decisions.  
Thus, it appears that trial-and-error-learning would increase in usage over the early stages 
of the ventures’ life as it builds knowledge, routines, and slack resources.  However, 
given the non-systematic nature of its utilization (Miner et al., 2001), we would expect the 
use of this mode of learning to level off or decrease over time as firms’ processes and 
knowledge become more structured.  In short, we see trial-and-error learning as an im-
portant mode for the early development of the firm, but we do not expect that it will 
continue to be used at the same rate later in the life of the venture. Therefore:  
P6b.  Trial-and-error learning first becomes an increasingly  and then a 
decreasingling likely choice for developing and using dynamic capabilities 
as firms age. 
 
We have used the literature to argue that efforts to upgrade capabilities tend to be 
spontaneous and spur-of-the-moment for young firms, a condition which itself requires 
continual change in how new ventures respond to change.  In contrast, established com-
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panies are likely to be more deliberate in their approach to thinking about, developing, 
and re-configuring capabilities.  In established firms, senior managers will typically have 
more resources to devote to systematically exploring the potential contributions of exist-
ing approaches to performance. Managers are apt to focus also on leveraging what their 
companies are already doing while stretching the uses of given capabilities into new fields 
(Hamel & Prahalad, 1994).  Such tendencies match Miner et al.’s (2001: 319) observa-
tions of the characteristics of experimental learning. They note that in experimental 
learning, “inputs are deliberately varied and contexts compared so outcomes can be at-
tributed to inputs... Reflection is high because observing outcomes under varied condi-
tions is the goal.” 
For the resource and time reasons articulated in propositions 6a and 6b, young 
firms will have little inclination or ability to “experiment” in order to develop their capa-
bilities.  They will rarely have the luxury of planning ahead how they might convert sub-
stantive capabilities over time, much less the luxury of waiting for or comparing the re-
sults of multiple experiments.  Consistent with Sarasvathy's (2001) work on effectuation 
(which posits that entrepreneurial search often proceeds from resources to goals rather 
than the reverse), young firms sink or swim with what they have; they tend to learn by 
doing.  As time passes, however, these firms will become increasingly aware of exactly 
what they know and do not know and will be more able to design and execute experi-
ments to revise capabilities.  Furthermore, if indeed they do become increasingly bound 
to existing ways of doing things (Autio et al., 2000; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Majumdar, 
2000), the more incremental and controlled means of gaining knowledge afforded by ex-
perimentation will become increasingly appealing.  Thus, we propose:  
P6c.  Experimentation becomes an increasingly likely choice for develop-
ing and using dynamic capabilities as firms age. 
 
Besides experimentation, another important source of intentional change or 
variation in organizations is imitation (Aldrich, 1999).  Although many new ventures may 
initiate or change routines based on imitation of others, an effective process of imitation 
is more complex and difficult than is readily apparent.  Miner, Raghavan and Haunschild 
(1999) note that firms use different bases of imitation (frequency of use, outcomes, and 
traits) and may find imitation as challenging as the creation of their own change proc-
esses because of lack of transparency and lack of commensurability across settings.  Al-
though incentives to emphasize imitation as a means of selecting and initiating change 
would appear to differ between young and mature firms, the net result may be that young 
and old are equally likely (or unlikely) to learn through imitation.  Young firms may wish 
to use imitation as a means of acquiring new knowledge because of their relative inexpe-
rience and lack of knowledge.  Older firms may observe newcomers succeeding where 
they have stumbled and wish to “get in on” the new way of doing things; institutional 
pressures from external stakeholders may also push them to conform to the state of the 
art. Even without external pressure, managers in some older firms may simply deem that 
it is time to try something new, and, rather than “re-inventing the wheel” they may look 
to copy ideas from competitors.  
Imitation holds some perils for firms of any age as well.  Young firms’ lack of ex-
perience may limit the extent to which they can choose the right candidates for imitation; 
it may also hamper their ability to execute imitated actions effectively, even if they 
choose the right ones.  Older firms may simply perpetuate their own sedentary habits if 
they copy rather than create new processes.  Yet, because of the unpredictable nature of 
transferring practices across organizational boundaries, imitation can actually be a rea-
sonable source of innovation (Aldrich, 1999), intendedly or unintendedly, for both young 
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and old firms.  In summary, it appears that incentives to utilize and to eschew imitation 
exist for both younger and older firms. Therefore: 
P6d.  Imitation for developing and using dynamic capabilities is unrelated 
to firms' age. 
 
Despite the popular idea that young firms are much more agile and ‘fit’ for 
change (such as the re-configuring of routines) than are older firms, Aldrich (1999) notes 
that evidence in the sociological literature on whether organizational variation is associ-
ated with age is equivocal at best.  Further, based on his review of 18 empirical studies, 
Baum (1996)  concluded that the age-variation association was unclear and recom-
mended that researchers focus their energy instead on understanding the underlying 
processes. We have proposed above that a firm’s choice of processes of change may be 
related to age: e.g., greater use of improvisation early on and greater experimentation 
later on.   We now suggest that the amount and speed of change in capabilities may be 
related to the chosen processes as well. 
By its very nature, experimentation implies a higher level of control than that pre-
sent in improvisation and even trial-and-error learning.  The deliberate and systematic 
choice of inputs for subtle variation and comparison used in experimentation allows for 
fine-grained understanding of the effects of incremental change. In contrast, improvisa-
tion requires that a firm “invent” on the fly, that it proceed without a roadmap as to 
where it is going, and that it contend with whatever may come its way.  Trial-and-error 
learning also requires that a firm voyage outside its familiar comfort zone (Miner et al., 
2001).  Both improvisation and trial-and-error learning thus involve some unplanned and 
online aspects not typical in experimentation.  Given its reliance on detailed planning and 
evaluation, experimentation requires more time from initiation to integration of lessons 
learned then improvisation and trial-and-error learning. Consistent with this assertion, 
Eisenhardt and Tabrizi (1995) found that, in comparison to trial-and-error learning,  
planning tools increase time to develop responses.   
Not only may the speed of change be greater with the less structured learning 
processes, but the amount of change may be greater as well. Using controlled experiments 
to drive change limits the firm to its sphere of knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).  
The truly novel and unexpected is much more likely to emerge when the firm opens itself 
to learning from unstructured, external stimuli (Zahra & George, 2002a).  Indeed, Al-
drich (1999) notes that processes emanating out of the lack of knowledge may produce 
the greatest variations. Thus, taken together, the foregoing arguments suggest that the 
speed and amount of re-configuration of a firm’s capabilities will depend in part on the 
learning processes themselves.  Given that “planned” change processes require more 
time to develop and that they tend to remain in the vicinity of what is known, we pro-
pose:  
P7. The amount and speed of change in substantive capabilities is greater 
from trial-and-error and improvisation than experimentation processes. 
 
Table 4 presents an overview of the implications of the foregoing propositions.  
We consider Table 4 suggestive rather than definitive because many of the ideas in this 
layout have not been tested, nor have we had space within the framework of this review 
to develop all of the underlying logic.  It is worth noting that our focus on how organiza-
tional age affects the propensity to choose different learning styles highlights two impor-
tant issues.  First, the tendency to choose particular learning modes explains, on average, 
why younger firms are more likely to change more dramatically than older firms. Still, the 
fact that some do not choose in this fashion explains why the link between age and ca-
pacity to change is not clear-cut (Aldrich, 1999; Baum, 1996; Majumdar, 2000).  This fact 
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highlights why managers are an important aspect for understanding the evolution and 
development of dynamic capabilites: development, though path dependent, is not inevi-
table nor deterministic. Managers’ perceptions, preferences, capacities, and errors signifi-
cantly influence the path taken and its results.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
One aspect of Table 4 is worth a special mention here. We imply in the table, but 
do not develop in our arguments, that routines start as relatively simple processes, be-
come more complex, and finally tend toward simplicity once again.  The logic is that 
firms start with little knowledge or resources, add resources and knowledge as they grow 
so that the complexity of relations among components expands, and finally simplifies as 
they become more knowledgable and efficient.    Yet, this pattern may be disrupted un-
der conditions of severe upheaval so that the performance of firms that cling to old, 
simplified patterns when change is necessary, may suffer.  We now turn our attention to 
the issue of dynamic capabilities and performance.   
Dynamic Capabilities and Organizational Performance:  We began our re-
view of the popular definitions of dynamic capabilities with the opinion that a good defi-
nition should not define the concept in terms of its results.  In particular, we objected to 
defining dynamic capabilities as those capabilities that produced superior performance in 
dynamic environments.  We are still left, however, with the question of whether dynamic 
capabilities are directly and significantly related to organizational performance. Indeed, a 
major reason for the ongoing interest in dynamic capabilities is their potential for influenc-
ing a firm’s performance.  We agree with Eisenhardt and Martin's (2000) view that having 
dynamic capabilities per se does not lead to superior firm performance. Such capabilities 
are necessary but not sufficient for conditions with a sustained advantage. If the substan-
tive capabilities upon which they operate are mediocre and remain so after reconfigura-
tion, no advantage will accrue.  Yet, we would argue that given two firms with equivalent 
substantive capabilities, those firms with superior dynamic capabilities are more likely to 
meet emerging challenges in a timely fashion. The fact that different firms could arrive at 
the same point from different processes or angles does not diminish the potential advan-
tage of possessing the ability to rapidly adjust, reconfigure, or change as desired.  
We believe that the  realization of the potential advantage accruing to dynamic 
capabililities depends on two factors: the need to change and the wisdom of the chosen 
changes.  The less often a firm needs to change, the lower the opportunity to cover the 
costs of developing dynamic capabilities.  Our premise that the development and use of 
dynamic capabilities involves costs has implications for the potential value of the dy-
namic capabilities.  If a firm rarely has need to change substantive capabilities because its 
market or technological environment is stable, its performance may be harmed if it ex-
pends significant resources to develop change capabilities.  On the other hand, if the en-
vironment is highly volatile, frequently and unpredictably necessitating changes in sub-
stantive capabilities, the potential value of dynamic capabilities can be quite high.  In 
short, we hold that the potential value of dynamic capabilities is moderated by the dyna-
mism of the external environment. Therefore:   
P8.  The potential gain from dynamic capabilities (through substantive 
capabilities and organizational knowledge) is greater in dynamic environ-
ments. 
 
Several studies have attempted to catalog and document the various effects of 
dynamic capabilities. Several of these studies appear in Table 1 (see “outcomes’), cover-
ing larger and well established companies. The literature summarized in Table 2 high-
lights key reasons why dynamic capabilities can improve a firm’s performance. For ex-
ample, Anand (2001) argues that a dynamic alliance capability enables the firm to choose 
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good and reliable partners and structure their relationships effectively, and gain new 
knowledge that improves its performance.  Teece et al. (1997) note that dynamic capabili-
ties renew a firm’s competencies that improve performance, especially in dynamic mar-
kets.  Rindova and Taylor (2002) believe that a dynamic management capability is essen-
tial for upgrading a firm’s managerial skills to spot and exploit opportunities in evolving 
environments. Daniel and Wilson (2003) suggest that dynamic capabilities enhance the 
success of organizational transformational efforts. Lee, Lee and Rho (2002) observe that 
a new source of competitive advantage lies in the ability to conceptualize how firms can 
cope with environmental changes by identifying and exploiting opportunities. These 
views reflect the general tenor of the literature on the value of dynamic capabilities to 
creating and sustaining competitive advantage.  
 Some researchers observe, however, that not all organizational learning or change 
is purposeful or useful (Huber, 1991).  Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), for example, ques-
tion whether dynamic capabilities are capable of providing a sustainable advantage for 
firms.  We have ourselves asserted that dynamic capabilities are costly and that they may 
be used to achieve misguided aims.  For us, then, the effect of dynamic capabilities on 
performance will depend on the quality of the organization’s knowledge base.  The use 
of dynamic capabilities when they need not be implemented or when based on incorrect 
cause-effect assumptions may harm rather than help performance outcomes.  Yet, as the 
knowledge base of the firm increases, so should the positive outcomes of the learning 
and change processes.  Consistent with this position is Moorman and Miner’s (1998b) 
finding that even though organizational memory has a negative effect on the propensity 
to improvise, it significantly improves the positive effects of improvisation on processes 
and outcomes.  
To summarize, currently there is some disagreement in the literature on the po-
tential effect(s) of dynamic capabilities on organizational performance. Some researchers 
believe that dynamic capabilities necessarily enhance performance by increasing companies’ 
agility and strategic flexibility.  We have argued, instead, that the effects of dynamic capa-
bilities on organizational performance work through substantive capabilities (“what the 
firm can do”) and depend on the quality of the organization’s knowledge base (“what the 
firm knows”),  as Figure 1 shows. Therefore: 
P9a. The relationship between dynamic capabilities and performance is 
mediated by the (resulting) quality of substantive capabilities. 
 
P9b. The effect of substantive capabilities (and, indirectly, dynamic capa-
bilities) on performance is moderated by organizational knowledge such 
that low organizational knowledge increases losses and high organiza-
tional knowledge increases gains. 
 
As the above discussion indicates, changes in the firm’s entrepreneurial processes 
and resource allocation patterns can set the stage for developing new substantive capa-
bilities that open up new strategic options and require the parallel development of corre-
sponding dynamic capabilities. Burgelman (1983) has noted that a firm’s strategy guides 
such choices. Managers may also see the potential for a new strategic direction in the 
process of exercising new capability development; thus, capability development may also 
drive new strategy. Over time, some firms may develop dynamic capabilities that stimu-
late and foster an entrepreneurial orientation throughout their operations.   
The ongoing cycle between strategy and capability development makes it possible 
for the firm to quickly exploit its discoveries in conceiving and implementing innovative 
strategic alternatives that give the firm a potential source of competitive advantage. The 
novelty of these strategies improves the firm’s market standing. This cycle also reduces 
  
18
the time that elapses between the development of new strategies and their execution, en-
hancing the firm’s agility and market responsiveness.   
Discussion 
 Dynamic capability is an important and complex concept that occupies a central 
place in the entrepreneurship and  competitibve strategy literatures. Recognizing this im-
portance and complexity, we have defined the concept so as to avoid tautology and have 
developed a framework that explicates the relationships among substantive capabilities, 
dynamic capabilities, learning, and organizational performance. We have emphasized the 
role that managerial choice plays in these processes and have posited that the realized 
value of dynamic capabilities depends on environmental conditions and organizational 
knowledge. Our framework highlights the role of organizational learning in the evolution 
of capabilities.  This view  extends the ideas of Cyert and March (1963) who suggest that 
organizational learning is multifaceted and centers on adaptations of goals, existing atten-
tion rules (what is important), and existing search rules (where and how to look for new 
ideas and knowledge). We have also articulated key differences between new ventures 
and established companies in the nature and use of their dynamic capabilities. We now 
discuss some of the implications of our framework for managerial practice and theory. 
Managerial Implications 
 
 Our definition of dynamic capabilities places entrepreneurs and managers at the 
center of the process by which companies give birth to substantive capabilities and de-
velop the dynamic capabilities to transform them over time.  Our view is that, it is man-
agers’ (and entrepreneurs’) visions and integration skills that make an important differ-
ence in directing the development of these capabilities. Thus, there is a need for manage-
rial vision in thinking about the firm’s competitive arena and the trajectory of its future 
evolution. Luck, of course, can play a role in which firms survive and thrive, but our 
propositions collectively suggest that over time those firms that develop the substantive 
capabilities that address current challenges and the dynamic capabilities to redeploy or 
reconfigure those capabilities are the ones that will be most likely to succeed as things 
change. Ultimately, firms that survive for a long period of time are those that keep fresh 
both these first-order and second-order talents. 
 The literature also highlights a need for dynamic capability development in dy-
namic environments.  The assumption that volatility and uncertainty of such environ-
ments exacerbates the salience of the ability to rapidly change direction has great validity.  
However, it is likely that firms in these environments are acutely aware of the value of 
such capacities.  More insidious might be the circumstances of firms, especially mature 
firms, in stable environments that overlook the need to keep current through their capac-
ity for renewal of stale routines.  These capacities are kept fresh through improvisation, 
trial-and-error learning, and experimentation. Use of dynamic capabilities keeps substan-
tive capabilities fresh and helps firms avoid some of the traps related to pure efficiency 
seeking repetition. 
Dynamic capabilities evolve from attempts to deal directly with the challenges of 
keeping substantive capabilities vibrant and with the organizational learning that occurs 
through the acquisition of new internal and external knowledge.  Moorman  and Miner 
(1998a, 1998b) observe that the capacity to adjust routines on the fly can result from en-
countering a situation for which the organization is not prepared. New situations and 
new challenges provide opportunities for organizational learning, setting a foundation for 
creating dynamic capabilities.  Although unanticipated circumstances may provide oppor-
tunities for learning, the greatest learning may occur if firms consciously experiment.  
Moorman and Miner (1998b) speculate that improvisation does not necessarily lead to 
learning, and McGrath (1995) cautions that unless firms carefully measure what they do, 
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define roles, and explicitly communicate results, little may be gained by a mere "bias for 
action."  Indeed, the notion that systematic planning may be detrimental for emerging 
ventures has recently been challenged (Delmar & Shane, 2003).  
The challenge for new and established firms is to create—to a degree sufficient 
to meet the challenges of their environment—a systematic openness to upgrading and 
revising their substantive capabilities, through a variety of learning modes.  Autio et al. 
(2000) posit that such openness (or lack thereof) becomes embedded in a firm's culture 
by its early choices.  Sapienza, DeClerq and Snadberg (2005) also found evidence that 
firms develop a degree to which they operate as a "learning culture;" i.e., they have found 
that firms tend to expend high or low levels of learning effort in all the markets in which 
they operate as opposed to being highly active in one and reactive in another. For estab-
lished companies that have developed a proactive approach, the trick is to continually 
renew the system itself in order to retain the dynamism of their capabilities.  Companies 
that have not operated in this fashion face a more daunting task: they have to break old 
habits, replace them with new ones, and then ensure that no reversion occurs. These 
firms have to learn how to develop and hone their dynamic capabilities.   
 
Theoretical Implications and Future Research Directions 
 Our article underscores the usefulness of integrating learning theory (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 2002a), the behavioral theory of the firm (March & 
Simon, 1958) and the dynamic capabilities literature (Nelson & Winter, 1982) to better 
understand how organizations adapt and create value (Mahoney, 2005). Our model (Fig-
ure 1) and our nine propositions provide new ways of seeing current literature and sug-
gest several avenues for future research.  
Our Model. Figure 1 indicates that entrepreneurial activities directly affect or-
ganizational performance which in turn feeds back to new entrepreneurial activity 
choices.  However, it also indicates a much more complex set of relationships among 
resources, learning processes, capability development, and organizational outcomes.  The 
key feature of the model is that dynamic capabilities mediate the relationships between 
substantive capabilities and organizational knowledge, resulting in an indirect impact of 
dynamic capabilities on performance.   
One implication of this model is that the nature and quality of both substantive 
capabilities and organizational knowledge stem from the resources and learning processes 
the venture puts in place early on.  New ventures and established companies might have 
different types of advantages of their own when it comes to developing and harvesting 
dynamic capabilities.  These differences are not well cataloged in the literature, and future 
research can enrich our understanding of these issues. Such understanding can help us 
form different prescriptions for new and established firms. For example, one of the most 
widely held assumptions is the malleability of new ventures’ routines, making it easier for 
founders and entrepreneurs to develop radically new capabilities (Autio et al., 2000).  Is it 
reasonable to assume that the routines of younger firms are relatively more malleable?  
What causes these routines to calcify in later stages?  How may they be kept flexible?  Do 
established companies have unique advantages in developing dynamic capabilities?  What 
is their source? Can they leverage their greater resources to an advantage?  How do older 
firms renew different routines and develop capabilities? These are a few of the questions 
we need to consider as we contemplate the differences between newer and established 
firms’ dynamic capabilities.  
Relationship between Dynamic and Substantive Capabilities.  Our proposi-
tions regarding the utilization of substantive and dynamic capabilities and their relation-
ship to one another hold some interesting dilemmas or paradoxes for ventures, young 
and old.  First, consistent with learning theory we propose that both types of capabilities 
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“strengthen” with use.  Here, we imply two qualities: they become better controlled and 
more ‘fit’ for their purposes, but they also become more persistent or resistant to exter-
mination.  Furthermore, because of the path dependent nature of learning, this also im-
plies that the earlier in the firm's formantion such capabilities are developed, the more 
deeply embedded in the culture of the firm is the propensity to develop and use such ca-
pabilities (Autio et al., 2000).   
A second implication is that dynamic capabilities are needed to keep substantive 
capabilities vibrant.  On the one hand, substantive capabilities atrophy without use; on 
the other, they become so embedded in organizational memory if not altered that flexi-
bility is harmed.  It is the function of dynamic capabilities to keep strong, exercised sub-
stantive capabilities supple.  Yet, we have not addressed here how a firm may keep its 
dynamic capabilities fresh.  Theoretically, a kind of 'infinite spiral' of capabilities to renew 
capabilities could be conceived.vi  A fruitful avenue for future research would be to de-
velop, explore and test ideas about how firms resolve this issue. 
Another implication of the first set of propositions is that the positive effects (if 
any) of dynamic capabilities require time to appear because of the costs involved in de-
veloping and exercising them.  Thus, if researchers are sampling and testing the effects of 
dynamic capabilities, it might be wise for them to expect that measurable positive out-
comes will take some time to appear. The longer the time period sampled following the 
development of a dynamic capability, the more positive the observed relationship will 
likely be.  Further, Proposition 8 suggests that the more volatile the environment during 
this period, the greater will be the likelihood of a large, positive effect. It is also possible 
that although frequent changes prevent optimizing current substantive capabilities, the 
frequent changes may occasionally result in early innovations (in 'crude' form) with sub-
stantial cost or quality advantage over competition. 
 Many other fruitful areas of investigation of the relationship between substantive 
and dynamic capabilities may be explored.  For example, an interesting question is 
whether different substantive capabilities demand different skills in developing relevant 
dynamic capabilities. If so, how do these vary? Are some more difficult to develop than 
others? Is there an optimal sequence for developing these capabilities?  Finally, an inter-
esting question is whether there is a core dynamic capability skill that is common to all of 
the various dynamic capabilities the firm develops.  If there is something common or at 
the core, is it truly a skill or is it more an attitude or orientation (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; 
Sapienza et al., 2006)? 
Triggers for Dynamic Capabilities. Assumptions central to the strategic choice 
framework (Bazerman, 2002; Child, 1972, 1997; Friend & Hickling, 2005; King & Tucci, 
2002) are implicit in our model of the triggers for dynamic capability development and 
use. More specifically, we assume that entrepreneurs and other key organizational deci-
sion makers are boundedly rational and undertake choices designed to maximize organ-
izational goals.  Fittingly, then, Proposition 3 posits that firms with greater integration 
skills are more inclined to leverage these skills as the positive feedback from their appli-
cation encourages further use.  Proposition 4 holds that failing with current applications 
spurs attempts to change, and Proposition 5 implies that when the environment changes 
rational decision makers will change what they are doing.  What we do not take up is 
when decison makers may be inclined to deviate from these expectations.   
Two categories of deviance from these expectations may be worth exploring.  
One category is factors that cause suspension of rational economic decision making.  
This suspension could be the result of adopting, at least temporarily, goals other than the 
maximization of return.  For example, decision makers may adopt, or be pressured to 
adopt, employment maximization as its central goal.  This shift would certainly affect 
what would or would not trigger the development and use of dynamic capabilities.  Al-
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ternatively, rational thinking itself may be disrupted without changing avowed goals.  For 
example, phenomena such as threat rigidity response (Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 1981) 
may occur in the face of certain types of threats but not others.   
Another category is the circumstances that lead managers to conclude that the 
development and use of dynamic capabilities may be harmful.  For example, perhaps 
firms that are operating on the margins of existence would conclude that any change (in 
the short run) would spell termination of the business.  Alternatively, implicit or explicit 
contracts may render change illegal or a violation of agreements.  A third possibility is 
when managers judge drastic environmental change or disruption as temporary and there 
is a high likelihood of "return" to former circumstances.  Investigating what kinds of sig-
nals or circumstances would induce this type of judgment would be interesting in its own 
right.  In short, there are many potential contingencies that scholars may deem best to 
define the boundaries or qualifications of our propositions regarding the triggers for dy-
namic capability development. 
Organizational Age and Learning Modes.  One contribution of this article is 
our delineation of potential differences between new and established firms in the proc-
esses and attributes of dynamic capability creation (Table 4).  Future researchers could 
expand upon our logic, empirically examine the suggested differences, and relate them to 
performance. It might also be insightful to attempt to link differences in learning proc-
esses not only to organizational age but to differences in competitive positions and 
growth trajectories. 
 Assumptions about older and younger firms should also be examined in greater 
depth in future research.  As with our earlier propositions, we highlight here general ten-
dencies rather than "laws" regarding the relationships between age and learning mode 
choice.  However, some have noted that new and established companies also differ in 
their resources, managerial processes, systems, their entrepreneurial intensity, and their 
focus (e.g., Autio et al., 2000; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996).  The implication of these differ-
ences would be not only that companies might make different choices regarding learning 
modes, but also that if they made the same choices, the consequences might differ.   
 In our quest for parsimony, we portrayed expected activities and phenomena in 
starkly different terms. However, some researchers claim that differences are overstated 
in the literature (e.g., Majumdar, 2000).  Empirical documentation of these differences, as 
well as their sources and magnitude, are required to fully understand the links between 
organizational age, choice, and capability configuration.  Research designs that include 
tracking new ventures over time should improve our understanding of these phenomena.  
Researchers should also recognize that firms vary significantly in their origins, 
history and goals.  Different founding conditions may cause ventures to evolve differ-
ently and, as a result, to develop different types of learning capabilities at different stages 
of their evolution (Vohora et al., 2004). These variables are likely to shape how these 
ventures reconfigure their resources and build different dynamic capabilities at different 
stages of their evolution.  Penrose (1959), among others (Mahoney, 2005) also highlight 
the importance of differences in top teams in their firm-specific experiences as a key 
source of innovation, especially in transforming resources (notably managerial resources) 
to a key source of innovation that fosters organizational growth. 
The literature (and our own elaboration of propositions) implies that studied ex-
perimentation, trial-and-error learning, and improvisation are useful.  Even if this as-
sumption is correct, it is too broad to be of much use in guiding managerial choices.  
What kinds of experimentation should be undertaken? By whom, and across which ac-
tivities?  When might such processes be more or less likely to lead to disruptive tech-
nologies or breakthrough process innovations?  
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Finally, our brief coverage of learning types suggest many additional areas to be 
studied.  For example, is it important to balance across the types of learning modes in 
order to ensure learning or to prevent "lopsided learning"?  How do other types of learn-
ing (such as learning-before-doing) relate to organizational age, and are there interactive 
effects of modes of learninng?   For example, it could be that improvisation and experi-
mentation are powerful in conjunction with one another because the former keeps the 
firm agile and the latter disciplined.  It may be that imitation is more efficacious early or 
late in organizational development, even if it is no more or less common.  Clearly, much 
remains to be explored in regards to learning modes and organizational development.  
Dynamic Capabilities and Organizational Performance. We have suggested 
that the creation of dynamic capabilities is not necessarily associated with higher per-
formance.  For one thing, an inevitable outcome of a high number attempts to change 
and improve is a high number of “failed” experiments.  For new ventures, too many of 
these consecutive attempts could damage a new venture’s credibility and even lead to its 
demise.  Established companies also pay dearly for failed experiments, though these 
firms are buffered somewhat by their slack resources.  Competitors also learn vicariously 
and through competitive intelligence from the actions of the innovating firm. Some of 
these capabilities might become a source of rigidity as the firm overuses them in their 
operations.   
At the same time, errors themselves provide new, useful and important informa-
tion that could facilitate the building of sustainable advantage.  McGrath (1995) directly 
examines the impact of unsuccessful innovation and concludes that in order to create 
capabilities, companies must be able to live with these errors. Building dynamic capabili-
ties allows firms to conceive of new resources and explore new uses for their resources. 
Firms that have this orientation are less likely to be caught in the various maturity, famili-
arity, and propinquity traps (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001) than those that never experiment 
for fear of failure.  They also enable strategic renewal (Sathe, 2003; Zahra, Nielsen & 
Bogner, 1999), enhance the strategic variety of the firm’s decision-making process (Bur-
gelman, 1991; Miller, 1993), and keep competition off-balance by leaving open many al-
ternative paths.  Proposition 8 states our position that dynamic environments afford the 
greatest number or size of opportunities for the realization of such advantages through 
the use of dynamic capabilities. 
Figure 1 and Proposition 9 indicate that the impact of dynamic capabilities occurs 
through substantive capabilities and depends upon the quality of the knowledge upon 
which the choices are based.  Given that managers are choosing in uncertain environ-
ments, errors in judgment are always possible and may lead to suboptimal performance 
(endnote #4).  Our framework does not explicitly address how this information or 
knowledge may be best maintained to lead to the best judgments.  Implicitly, however, 
our argumentation and framework suggest that, on average, the more active a firm is in 
developing and exercising its capabilities, the more likely these choices will be superior.  
A great deal of room is left here for future researchers to fill out our theoretical reason-
ing and to test these ideas.  
A key question in the evolving dynamic capabilities literature is whether dynamic 
capabilities give a firm a sustainable competitive advantage.  Eisenhardt and Martin 
(2000) advance that dynamic capabilities are not a source of sustainable strategic advan-
tage because firms can reach the same resource configurations via different processes or 
paths. Thus, they point out, a degree of equifinality (i.e., same end result via multiple dif-
ferent paths) exists with regard to these capabilities.  Their view is that similar dynamic 
capabilities exist across different firms and thus that “idiosyncratic firm effects” are over-
stated in the literature.  We agree with them in part, but in part we disagree. We agree 
that un-bounded sustainable competitive advantage itself is likely a myth.  The competi-
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tive landscape simply changes too much, too often, and too unpredictably for any capa-
bility to confer a permanently sustainable advantage. The emphasis is on the fact that mul-
tiple firms may arrive at the same (or very similar) resource configurations via different 
means; hence, they conclude that the two are essentially equivalent. However, we hold 
that even if the same resource configuration or substantive capability (which they call 
"best practices") is achieved, the differences in means to get there (dynamic capabilities) 
do matter.  The reason they matter is that for two firms in exactly the same place (meta-
phorically), where they go next and how quickly they get there will differ if their dynamic 
capabilities are different.  The relative validity of these two positions is open to further 
theorizing and testing. 
Conclusion   
A growing body of research highlights the importance of entrepreneurial activi-
ties for the conception, development, configuration and maintenance of dynamic capa-
bilities in new ventures and established companies.  Building on this emergent literature, 
we have proposed a model of the various links among these variables and how dynamic 
capabilities might influence a company’s performance. We have offered in this article a 
definition intended to make clear separations of dynamic capabilities from substantive 
capabilities, environmental conditions, and performance outcomes.  We have also intro-
duced the role of the strategic decision maker into our definition.   
Our model (Figure 1) highlights a firm’s entrepreneurial process as the “starting 
point” in conceptualizing the process by which both substantive and dynamic capabilities 
come into existence.  This process itself is fertile territory for theoretical and empirical 
investigation.  Here, we have focused on developing several testable propositions in-
tended to advance the understanding of the relationships among variables central to dy-
namic capabilities inquiry, their antecedents, and their outcomes. We hope that other 
scholars will take up the challenge of  further exploring and testing these ideas. 
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A Stylized Model of Capability Formation and Performance 
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Figure 2 
 
Evolutionary and Path Dependent Processes in Dynamic Capability Development 
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Overview of Past Reseearch on Dynamic Capabilities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
New Ventures 
 
Established Companies 
 
 
Nature 
 
George, Zahra, Autio & Sapienza (2004) 
 
Eisenhardt & Martin (2000); Geiger & Kliesch (2005);  
Winter (2003)  
 
 
Antecedents 
 
Arthurs and Busenitz (2005) 
 
Blyler & Coff (2003); Korr & Mahoney (2005);Verona  & Ravasi 
(2003); Wheeler (2002); Zollo & Winter (2002) 
 
 
Process 
 
George et al. (2004) 
 
George (2005); Lampel & Shamsie (2003); Lazonick & Prencipe 
(2005); Mosey (2005); Salvato (2003); Zollo & Winter (2002) 
 
 
Outcomes 
 
Arthurs & Busenitz (2005); 
Newbert (2005); Sapienza, Autio, 
George & Zahra (2006) 
 
Blyler & Coff (2003); Bowman & Ambrosini (2003); Eisenhardt & 
Martin (2000);  George (2005); Lazonick & Prencipe (2005); Lenox 
& King (2004); Verona  & Ravasi (2003);  Zahra & George (2002b) 
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Table 2 
 
Key Definitions of Dynamic Capabilities 
 
 
Author 
 
Definition 
 
 
Helfat (1997) 
 
The subset of the competences/capabilities which allow the firm to create new products and processes and respond to 
changing market circumstances. 
 
Teece, Pisano & Shuen (1997) 
 
The firm's ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing 
environments.  
 
Eisenhardt &  Martin (2000) 
 
The firm's processes that use resources - specifically the processes to integrate, reconfigure, gain and release resources - 
to match or even create market change. Dynamic capabilities thus are the organizational and strategic routines by 
which firms achieve new resources configurations as market emerge, collide, split, evolve and die. 
 
Griffith & Harvey (2001) 
 
A global dynamic capability is the creation of difficult-to-imitate combinations of resources, including effective coordi-
nation of inter-organizational relationships, on a global basis that can provide a firm a competitive advantage. 
 
Lee, Lee & Rho (2002) 
 
A newer source of competitive advantage in conceptualizing how firms are able to cope with environmental changes. 
 
Rindova &  Taylor(2002) 
 
Dynamic capabilities evolve at two levels: a micro-evolution through "upgrading the management capabilities of the 
firm" and a macro-evolution associated with "reconfiguring market competencies." 
 
Zahra & George (2002a)  
 
Dynamic capabilities are essentially change-oriented capabilities that help firms redeploy and reconfigure their resource 
base to meet evolving customer demands and competitor strategies. 
 
Zollo & Winter (2002) 
 
A dynamic capability is a learned and stable pattern of collective activity through which the organization systematically 
generates and modifies its operating routines in pursuit of improved effectiveness. 
 
Winter (2003) 
 
Those that operate to extend, modify or create ordinary (substantive) capabilities. 
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Table 3 
 
Review of Representative Studies on Organizational Learning and Capability Development 
 
 
Authors (Year) 
  
 
Type of 
Study 
 
Sample & Method 
 
Key issue (s) examined 
 
Results or conclusions  
1. Van de Ven & 
Polley (1992)  
 
 
Empirical Single biomedical  innova-
tion over a five year period; 
in-depth case study with 
multiple sources and ongo-
ing observation 
Examined the process of trial 
and error learning in techno-
logical innovations by a Joint 
Venture created to commer-
cialize products 
-Observed greater escalation of commitment 
and other types of non-rational behavior 
than implied in the learning literature 
-Suggested the following to increase adaptation 
ability: 
* separate planning from resource funding 
* limit 'impression management' opportu-
nities 
* foster frank communication across de-
partments and levels    
2. Eisenhardt & 
Tabrizi (1995) 
  
 
Empirical 36 Computer-related firms, 
(72 projects); case studies-- 
multi-respondents per pro-
ject 
Examined effects of plan-
ning, CAD tools, teams, 
supplier involvement, re-
ward, and time schedules on 
product development time 
-Found planning and CAD tools increase the 
time to develop new products 
-Cross-functional teams, frequent iterations, 
leader power, and trial-and-error learning de-
crease development time 
3. McGrath (1995)  
 
 
Empirical 23 Financial services firms; 
over 200 interviews 
Exploratory research to see 
how firms process and learn 
from poor outcomes  in in-
ternal corporate venturing 
-Noted three processes needed to learn from 
disappointments: 
*Recognition of failure (measurement, in-
volvement, communication of results) 
*Interpretation of results into a business 
model that can be tested 
*Action taken to change routines 
 
4. Helfat (1997) Empirical 26 largest Energy firms Examined if success of re- -Firms with larger stocks of complementary 
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Authors (Year) 
  
 
Type of 
Study 
 
Sample & Method 
 
Key issue (s) examined 
 
Results or conclusions  
 
 
over extended period of 
time; historical and secon-
dary data 
sponses to changes in exter-
nal conditions depends on 
existing stocks of comple-
mentary know-how and as-
sets 
technological knowledge and physical assets 
experienced greater increase in capabilities 
-Yet, such increased capabilities could not 
compensate for the large drop in real oil 
prices 
5.  Brown & Eis-
enhardt (1997) 
 
 
Empirical 6 firms in computer indus-
try, (41 projects); case stud-
ies 
Examined the ability of firms 
to change their competences 
continuously in response to 
high velocity environments 
-Reject notion of punctuated equilibrium and 
event-based approaches in favor of time-paced 
responses. Learning and dynamic capability 
creation based on: 
*well-defined managerial responsibilities 
and project priorities 
*extensive communication 
*frequent low-cost experiments and itera-
tions 
6. Moorman & 
Miner (1998a) 
 
 
Conceptual n.a. Consider how procedural & 
declarative organizational 
memory moderate the effects 
of improvisation on the nov-
elty, speed, & coherence of 
organization action 
-Argue that improvisation (convergence of 
planning and action) has no direct effects on 
organization action but is moderated thus: 
*presence of existing routines (procedural 
memory) will decrease novelty, increase 
speed and coherence 
* presence of prior related knowledge (de-
clarative memory) will increase novelty 
and coherence, but decrease speed  
7. Moorman & 
Miner (1998b) 
 
 
Empirical One electronics instru-
ments firm; one food 
products firm (107 action 
events over nine months); 
survey data on selected 
Examined the effects envi-
ronmental turbulence, im-
provisation, and organization 
memory on product and 
process effi-
-Turbulence has a weak positive effect on use 
of improvisation 
-When turbulence is low, improvisation has 
negative effect on effectiveness; when turbu-
lence is high, the effect is positive 
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Authors (Year) 
  
 
Type of 
Study 
 
Sample & Method 
 
Key issue (s) examined 
 
Results or conclusions  
events ciency/effectiveness -Organization memory has a negative effect on 
improvisation 
-However, organization memory significantly 
improves positive effects of improvisation 
on all process & product outcomes   
8. Zahra et al. 
(1999) 
 
 
Conceptual 
 
n.a. Considers the skills that add 
unique value to a firm's 
products or services; espe-
cially interested in how 
knowledge integration mod-
erates the effects of new 
knowledge on competence 
development 
-Argues that learning enables the creation and 
extension of existing competencies via the ap-
plication, integration, and deployment of ac-
quisitive (learning from external sources) and 
experimental (internal learning) knowledge 
-Argues that value creation requires manage-
ment to articulate, focus, share, and transfer 
knowledge 
-Argues that greater potential for distinctive-
ness and competitive advantage can be  
 derived from experimental learning 
9. Kazanjian & 
Rao (1999) 
 
 
Empirical 
(*) 
225 Computer -related 
companies; survey data in 
two waves 
 
Examined factors influencing 
engineering capability institu-
tionalization in firms highly 
dependent on this expertise.  
-Found managerial advocacy key positive factor 
-Found mixed results with regard to CEO 
background  
-Found institutionalization more likely with 
smaller TMTs 
-Found no effects of formalization or centrali-
zation 
10. Bosch, Vol-
berda and Boer 
(1999) 
 
 
Empirical  Publishing firms; illustra-
tion of two cases 
Focused on how organiza-
tion form and combinative 
capabilities mediate effects of 
prior related knowledge on 
absorptive capacity 
-Definitive conclusions hard to draw, but ar-
guments regarding organization forms are: 
Functional form is + for efficiency, -- for 
flexibility,  -- for speed 
Divisional form is -- for efficiency, + for flexi-
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Authors (Year) 
  
 
Type of 
Study 
 
Sample & Method 
 
Key issue (s) examined 
 
Results or conclusions  
bility,  + for speed 
Matrix form is -- for efficiency, + for flexibil-
ity,  + for speed 
11. Majumdar 
(2000) 
 
 
Empirical 39 Telecommunication  
firms over 16 yrs; secon-
dary data 
Examined effects of struc-
tural changes in the envi-
ronment on resource accu-
mulation, configuration, and 
utilization capabilities of 
firms 
Concludes that contrary to popular beliefs, lar-
ger more stable firms can indeed transform 
their capabilities in the face of overwhelming 
structural changes to the industry  
12. Autio, Sapi-
enza & Almeida 
(2000) 
 
 
Empirical 59 Electronics firms; panel 
survey data over four year 
period, some validation 
from repeat surveys and 
secondary sources  
Examined the effects of early 
inter-nationalization on the 
prospects of smaller firms' 
growth. Argued that such 
firms may possess learning 
advantages over older firms. 
-Found that internationalization at an early age 
was associated with greater growth both 
domestically and internationally 
-Found product imitability to be positively 
rather than negatively associated with growth  
-Found knowledge intensity positively related 
to growth 
13. Zahra, Ireland 
& Hitt (2000) 
 
 
Empirical 
(*) 
321 High technology firms 
(from 12 different sectors); 
survey data with validation 
from second respondents 
& secondary data 
Examined the effects of in-
ternational diversity and 
mode of market entry on 
technological learning and 
performance of high tech-
nology firms 
-Found that international diversity had positive 
effects on the breadth, depth, and speed of 
technological learning in new internationaliz-
ing high technology ventures 
-Found that knowledge integration significantly 
enhanced the positive effects of diversity on 
the breadth, depth, and speed of technologi-
cal learning; found that modes of entry also 
significantly affected breadth, depth, and 
speed of learning 
-Found a positive relationship between interna-
tional diversity and performance 
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Authors (Year) 
  
 
Type of 
Study 
 
Sample & Method 
 
Key issue (s) examined 
 
Results or conclusions  
14. Minniti & By-
grave (2001) 
 
 
Conceptual 
(*) 
n.a. Considered how entrepre-
neurs accumulate and update 
their knowledge bases 
-Argued learning occurs in unpredictable ways, 
based on ability of entrepreneur and random 
events that reinforce existing beliefs 
-Learning is path dependent and may be based 
on false feedback or information 
-Thus, entrepreneurs seek to maximize, but 
subjective assessments can be myopic, have 
elements of non-rational and suboptimal  
15. Ahuja & 
Lampert (2001) 
 
 
Empirical 97 global Chemical firms; 
secondary data, especially 
patent citations 
Examined how large corpo-
rations create breakthrough 
inventions and how explora-
tion of novel, emerging, and 
pioneering technology helps 
them overcome competency 
traps 
-Found inverted-U shaped relationship of ex-
ploration of novel and emerging technolo-
gies with creation of breakthrough invention  
-Found positive relationship of exploration of 
pioneering technologies with creation of 
breakthrough invention 
-Concluded that continual activity and experi-
mentation are needed for firms to renew and 
reconfigure capabilities 
16 Katila & Ahuja 
(2002) 
 
 
Empirical 124 Robotics firms; secon-
dary data, especially patent 
citations 
Examined the effects of 
search depth and search 
breadth on a firm's ability to 
create change in product in-
troduction 
-Found a positive relationship between search 
breadth and depth on new product introduc-
tion; but, beyond a certain level, additional 
depth begins to reduce new product intro-
duction 
-Concluded that exploitation is a broader con-
cept and more beneficial than previously be-
lieved 
 
Note:  (*) new firms study 
 
 
  
Table 4 
Dynamic Capabilities in New Ventures versus Established Companies 
 
Dimension 
 
New Ventures 
 
Established Companies 
 
Configuration and at-
tributes of   DC (num-
ber, scope, complexity, 
stability) 
 
 
• Few 
• Focused 
• Simple then complex 
• Rapidly changing 
 
 
• Many 
• Broad 
• Complex then simple 
• Resistant to change 
 
 
Triggers/ speed for the 
development and use of 
DC 
 
• Increasing integration skills,  
recent execution failures,  op-
portunities in previously unex-
plored areas, and major 
changes in demands from cus-
tomers 
• Development, use likely fol-
lows vary rapidly upon event; 
changes sometimes dramatic. 
 
 
• Presence of integration skills, recent 
repeated execution failures,  and major 
changes in the competitive landscape 
whereby competitors have leap-
frogged the firm’s technology or fea-
tures 
• Development, use occurs after a sig-
nificant gap following changed cir-
cumstances; changes rarely dramatic. 
 
Primary method(s) for 
discovering or develop-
ing DC 
 
• Trial-and-error 
• Improvisation 
• Imitation 
 
 
• Learning from experience 
• Planned change, Experimentation 
• Imitation 
 
Capability 
Upgrading 
• Learning is based on action 
more than planning. 
 
• A key goal is filling major gaps 
in the firm’s existing capability 
portfolio to explore opportuni-
ties for organic growth. 
• Deliberate, with an emergent quality. 
 
• The focus is on building dynamic ca-
pabilities that both leverage what the 
firm is already doing while stretching 
its competence basis. 
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Endnotes 
 
 
                                                 
i This distinction identifies the primary difference between our definition and that of Eis-
enhardt and Martin (2000); they see, e.g., product development capability as a dynamic capa-
bility because it results in new products for the firm, whereas as we see new product devel-
opment as a substantive capability operating through a set of routines.  For us, the ability to 
change product development routines would be a dynamic capability-- a dynamic new prod-
uct development capability if you will.  The firm may have a strong substantive product de-
velopment capability while having a weak or no corresponding dynamic capability to change. 
Without a substantive product development capability it cannot have a dynamic product de-
velopment capability.  
 
ii Again, Anand's rendering would be what we would call a substantive capability; the ability 
to re-configure how this partnering operates would be the dynamic alliance capability.  
 
iii A repeated theme of ours is that having dynamic capabilities is potentially very valuable, 
but creating value is not what determines whether the firm has a dynamic capability.  Just as 
a sword is potentially valuable in combat, one may fall on it as well; whether you have a 
sword is not determined by whether you succeed.  We believe it is very important to make 
the distinction between a dynamic capability (i.e., the ability to change existing substantive 
capabilities) and its effects (which may include a whole host of outcomes from increased 
costs, to organizational resistance, to sustainably superior performance).  
 
iv By principal decisionmakers we mean all those empowered to conceive or implement 
changes to the core substantive capabilities of the firm. In small or new firms this set proba-
bly includes but a relatively small number of top managers; in larger firms this set includes 
not only "top" managers but the set of middle managers key in strategy implementation and 
formation. There is still the following issue to note in our definition. Imagine two firms with 
identical substantive capabilities in the same environment. An objective environmental 
change occurs which requires a change of magnitude x to be optimally met. Firm A’s manag-
ers perceive a need for a change of magnitude x/4 and succeed in accomplishing this. Firm 
B’s managers correctly perceive a need for change of magnitude x, but only accomplish x/2. 
By our definition, Firm A's managers have greater dynamic capability for they can achieve 
closer to what they aim.  Yet Firm B's managers have greater knowledge and hence achieve 
greater results.  This aspect of our definition preserves its non-tautological quality.  The ex-
planation given here shows why knowledge moderates effects (see Figure 1) and is consistent 
with Proposition 9 developed later. 
 
v We acknowledge that this is not a comprehensive review of all studies potentially related to 
this topic. 
 
vi We thank the editor and reviewers for suggesting this idea. 
